The following notes correct a mistaken attribution and announce a discovery. They do so at some length because the matter amounts to rather more than reattribution of a known work. Identification of the text recently published as "The Written Record..." in Basil Bunting, *Three Essays*, as Roger Kaigh's "Paper"—supposed lost—throws new light on the intellectual context of Louis Zukofsky's writing while he was developing the critical concepts which defined his writing practice and the idea of the "Objectivist" poet. In addition, identification of "The Written Record..." as not Bunting's reveals more fully, by contrast, the significance of his essay "Some Limitations of English" as an example of the attention paid by poets to the cultural theories developed by Durkheim, Frobenius, and Lévy-Bruhl through the study of "savage" or "primitive" societies and, more particularly, to the ethnological reports from which their work was derived.

The research on which these notes are based was carried out over several months in 1995, the notes themselves having their own role to play in this since the deductive activity they record served to frame subsequent empirical enquiries. Rather than recast my findings synthetically to suggest a completed outcome I have retained the form of my original notes, which as they stand are the result of continual redrafting, for two reasons. The first is that lines of speculation and investigation which followed the initial discovery, in an essay attributed to Bunting, of a paragraph cited by Zukofsky as from "Paper" by Roger Kaigh, can tell a story, though not the whole story by any means, and I think it is important to glimpse the complex of wishes and exchanges, the network of relationships, which surrounded "Paper" and constitute its forgotten history. The second, already

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hinted, is more important. It would be rash to suppose that I have been able to locate all relevant evidence, and hence presumptuous to offer my findings in a more determinate form. My hope is, rather, that others may be able to add to the evidence presented here, and thus enable more definite conclusions to be reached, or discover broader implications in this episode. Some readers may, nevertheless, find it helpful to start with a summary of the information these notes adduce.

Early in 1929 Zukofsky made plans for a quarterly magazine, The States, to include in its first issue “Paper” by his Columbia classmate Irving Kaplan, writing under the pseudonym “Roger Kaigh”. “Paper” draws a distinction between formal and particular meanings of words, and its intellectual background includes the use by early 20th Century writers such as Lucien Lévy-Bruhl of the work of 19th Century ethnologists. (Kaplan thus shares a source with T. S. Eliot, whom elsewhere in his essay he attacks.) Later in 1929, when plans for The States were abandoned, Zukofsky sent some of the intended contents, including “Paper”, to Ezra Pound. Concurrently he discussed his own plans for critical essays concerned with what he termed the vitalization of words. A paragraph from “Paper” quoted in his “American Poetry 1920-1930” (completed June 1930) is pertinent to this. Later in 1930, writing to Pound from Berkeley where he was spending the summer with Kaplan, Zukofsky mentioned a scheme to publish “Paper” together with four of his own essays; it would be stated that “Roger Kaigh” was the pseudonym of an Arunta aboriginal.

Two manuscripts of “Paper” are now known to exist: one, at Durham University Library, formerly the property of Bunting, and recently published as by him; another, at the Harry Ransom Humanities Research Center, University of Texas at Austin, formerly the property of Zukofsky. The latter is a later typescript (though virtually identical textually with the Durham manuscript); the Durham manuscript is the major remnant of an earlier typescript from which preliminary matter has been excised, but was not the copy text for the Texas manuscript. The Texas manuscript also states that “Roger Kaigh” is the pseudonym of an Arunta, and dates the essay 1922-23; the Durham manuscript does not identify author or title.

There are significant affinities between “Paper” and Bunting’s “Some Limitations of English”, written in the Autumn of 1930. It is not known when or how he acquired a copy of “Paper”, but the supposition must be that he obtained it from Zukofsky, and there are good grounds to suppose that this was in 1930, while on a visit to America, when he met and corresponded with Zukofsky, and when “Paper” was fresh in Zukofsky’s mind. These grounds do not include the essays’ affinities, since Kaplan and Bunting may well have worked independently using Lévy-Bruhl and similar writers; if, indeed, Bunting did know “Paper” when he wrote his essay we may assume that its interest for him lay in his familiarity with its topics, and the different inflection he gave them. But it might also be surmised that Bunting acquired his copy, along with later Zukofsky manuscripts now at Durham, after he returned to America in 1938.

I. THE STATE OF CRITICISM IN AMERICA

Zukofsky’s essay “American Poetry 1920-1930” is a polemic statement of what was currently of value in American poetry. It was written from within the perspective of his own generation of poets in America, and its critical discriminations turn on a strategy designed to show that the London-based Imagism of the 1910s had been superseded in the later work of Pound, which had gone from an Imagist “isolation of the image” to “the poetic locus produced by the passage from one image to another.” We are to understand this specifically as an American quality, found also in the work of William Carlos Williams and Marianne Moore, for example; Zukofsky comments contrastively on the ill effects of English cultural influence on the writing of H.D., Wallace Stevens, and T. S. Eliot.

In the second section of his essay Zukofsky adapts the Poundian categories phanopoeia, melopoeia, and logopoeia to his own purposes as image, cadence, and idea, and insists that in poems these are inseparable. But for more detailed commentary on exemplary American work of the 1920s he substitutes for cadence and image the terms music and diction, terms in an equation which allows him to indicate just how they are inseparable in poems: “Music of word in a poem is to a great extent a matter of diction”, and “the diction of these poets remains their fully varied material”. Still to be brought into the
equation is logopoeia, idea, or its third terminological variant, and indeed at the conclusion of this section of the essay we find Zukofsky opting for the new term, meaning. He adopts this term from an unpublished essay by an unknown critic, and what is perhaps most immediately striking about this, for he is ordinarily a supremely confident critic, is Zukofsky’s explicit recourse to another’s views. The reason for this can best be understood, I believe, if we note that meaning there obtains a distinct and special sense. Defined in a way that binds meaning to a context of performative utterance, the new term can enter the equation with music and diction in a way that the term idea could not. Meaning is thus appropriately consequent, in Zukofsky’s sequence of topics, to diction.

The only diction which is dead today is that of poets who, as some one has said of Matthew Arnold, have put on singing robes to lose themselves in the universal. Anent this matter, a paragraph from Roger Kaigh’s Paper (still unpublished—the state of criticism in America is very low, as perhaps elsewhere) is not inappropriate. “The bias of paper, to this day, most radically affects logicians and philosophers. Logicians will admit that a word has more than one meaning, but each must be definite and thus distinct. Infinite shades of meaning cannot be recognized, for the instrument of formal logic depends upon static or categorical meanings, that is, definitions, for its operation. Otherwise the logician detects the fallacy of four terms. But categories which appear distinct upon paper derive an infinity of variations in speech. ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ are categorically distinct upon paper, but either may mean anything from emphatic ‘Yes’ to emphatic ‘No’ when spoken. For the context, gesture, intonation and pronunciation give words a stamp of meaning which a written form will lack.”

(It will be seen subsequently that Zukofsky had direct knowledge of the vicissitudes encountered in attempts to get “Paper” into print.) Here Kaigh’s argument that words in their written forms take on the character of logical categories is wittily introduced following reference to the universal. But Kaigh’s point about the dialogic and performative aspects of language is then taken up by Zukofsky in a comment rather less permissive than his remark about the “only diction which is dead today” might lead us to expect.

The diction employed by Pound, Eliot, Williams, M. Moore and Cummings has always tended towards the most definite connotation [sic] and to a varied play of connotation. The devices of emphasizing cadence by arrangement of line and typography have always been those which would clarify and render the meaning of the spoken word specific.³

Cadence, indicated by the arrangement of written forms (arrangements which can be understood to include diction rendered as lexical items written in series, as well as their typographical disposition as words on the page), produces that stamp of meaning acquired in the context of utterance. What Kaigh’s distinction between words written and words spoken in relation to fine shades of meaning contributes to Zukofsky’s critical discrimination of poetic values is the final term in the equation designating the congruence of poetic properties: music, diction, meaning. There is a case to be made, I think, that Kaigh’s nominalist objections to the general categories of logicians and philosophers allowed Zukofsky to think through and synthesise Pound’s tripartite division of poetic properties by bringing meaning into relation with formal features of poetic performance, and hence to detach it somewhat from denotation. “The things these poets deal with are of their world and time, but they are ‘modern’ only because their words are energies which make for meaning.” (My emphasis.)⁴

I find it striking that Zukofsky chose not to edit out reference to Kaigh when he incorporated this essay in Prepositions. In his retention of this passage in the collection of his miscellaneous critical writings in which much is revised, or omitted altogether, we might detect, as well as a gesture of indebtedness down the years, a recognition of the extent to which at this point in the essay Kaigh’s thinking overlaps and facilitates his own. It has long seemed to me unfortunate, so tantalising is the glimpse given by Zukofsky, that the full reach and force of Kaigh’s argument in “Paper” were lost to us.

³ Ibid., 78-9. I draw attention to the phrase “definite connotation” as a probable error in the printed text; Zukofsky subsequently amended it to read “precise intension” (Prepositions, Rapp and Carroll: London 1967, 139).
⁴ Ibid., 79.
2. THE WRITTEN RECORD

The two other essays included with "The Written Record . . ." in Basil Bunting, Three Essays, are "Some Limitations of English" and "The Lion and the Lizard". Bunting worked on the first of these in the latter part of 1930, and published it (with Zukofsky's assistance) in The Lion and Crown 1,1 (1932). The second is published for the first time, from a manuscript copy in the Zukofsky papers at the Harry Ransom Humanities Research Center, University of Texas at Austin; it appears that Bunting sent it to Zukofsky in 1935 when he was turning out old papers. To these is added (and perhaps just as well), "by way of an appendix", the much later piece "The Poet's Point of View", first published in 1966.

"The Written Record . . ." is also published for the first time, from a manuscript copy in the Mountjoy Collection, Durham University Library. The title is supplied from the opening words of the manuscript, which is cited thus in the 1991 handlist of the Mountjoy Collection and in Peter Makin, Bunting: The Shaping of his Verse. Makin's account of the essay confines itself, by and large, to its attack on Aristotelian logic, which he coopts for the purposes of his own attack on what he regards (not unjustly) as the relativism of contemporary critical theory and literary criticism. (His account of the essay comes in Part IV of his book, "Theory".) But his citations are too few and too brief to convey the characteristic tone of the essay, which for this reader at least was distinctly evocative of something imperfectly remembered. Paper is its primary referent: the phrases "paper age", "paper art", "paper records" occur in regular proximity. It attributes the concepts of permanence, universals, and intrinsic value to the ubiquity of paper. I am surely not the only reader to have had the experience of déjà lu on reading this essay, not because the themes are familiar (which they are) but because the motif paper carried a specific resonance. Having tracked that to its source in Zukofsky's essay it was a matter of minutes to establish the correlation. The paragraph from "Paper" quoted by Zukofsky occurs in the final section of "The Written Record . . .". This was surely enough to confirm that the manuscript published as "The Written Record . . ." is a surviving copy of "Paper". Reference in Part IV of "The Written Record . . ." to Australian aborigines' belief in spirit-causation, as will be seen below, reinforced this identification. But was "Roger Kaigh", as cited by Zukofsky, the pseudonym of Basil Bunting? This question, in the first flush of excitement of discovery, did not immediately suggest itself, but on subsequent reflection its importance became obvious.

3. MS 14: MOUNTJOY COLLECTION

The Mountjoy Collection at Durham University Library was acquired by purchase from Bunting's widow in 1988. It comprises 56 separate items, which the handlist assigns to five distinct groups: manuscripts and notebooks by Bunting; translations by others of poems by Bunting; correspondence; association manuscripts; and printed miscellanea. The first and fourth groups (Nos. 1-20, and 34-54) are of interest in the present context. The material in the other groups, including correspondence from Zukofsky, is recent, i.e. datable to the 1960s or later. The first group, which includes the manuscript known as "The Written Record . . .", consists also, for the most part, of recent material. (The other exceptions are some translations from the Persian from the late 1940s, undated transcriptions of Persian poetry from 19th Century editions, and The Pious Cat, a translation begun in the late 1930s and completed in 1977.) Most of the fourth group (Nos. 38-54) consists of manuscripts by Louis Zukofsky datable to the 1930s and early 1940s. It is, in fact, a major collection of manuscript material by Zukofsky, including versions of "agas" and "A's", Arise, Arise, material published in It was, and the unpublished A Workers Anthology. As a collection it bears witness to the close association of Zukofsky and Bunting.

MS 14, known as "The Written Record . . .", is untitled and unsigned. It comprises 11 typed leaves, the first two of which indicate that the text, although complete as it stands, has been revised by cutting from the head, and that the extant manuscript is the remainder of its original. The first leaf is an oblong slip of paper, and provides the first paragraph of the published text. The second leaf was originally numbered 2, but this has been altered in autograph to Roman I. (The rest of the manuscript is regularly paginated from 3 to

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Andrew Crozier

Paper Bunting

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10, with an additional unpaginated leaf of notes.) The first eight lines of the second leaf, and most of the ninth, have been cancelled in autograph. This completes the cancellation of a passage suppressed by the removal of a leaf from the original manuscript, which would have been the first leaf of a text presumably paginated from 1 to 10—from which the paper slip which now constitutes the first leaf was probably cut. Lines 8 to 11 of the second leaf were originally an independent paragraph, but autograph editorial markings connect its uncancelled portion to the following paragraph to provide the second paragraph of the published text, a peculiarity of which is that it thus ignores the autograph Roman numeral at the head of this leaf, but follows the sectional division of the text thereafter. (The numbering of sections in the manuscript later skips from II to IV in error, and this has been corrected editorially.) Removal of the original first leaf of the manuscript may, or may not, also have suppressed indications of author and title; these might just as well, or might not, have been given on a separate cover sheet. As the manuscript now stands, however, it appears makeshift as well as anonymous. The first paragraph, present as a slip attached to the remnant of the original manuscript, might have the character of radical afterthought. Indeed, were it not for the opening conjunction of the second paragraph (which, however, originally linked its sentence to a different antecedent) I might be inclined to read this paragraph not as the essay's opening paragraph but as its summary, and insert the autograph Roman numeral after it as the initial section number. Be that as it may, the new first leaf, as well perhaps as effacing identifying evidence, is indicative of a drastic revisionary motive not apparent elsewhere in the manuscript. Its closing reference to "two contemporary individuals" might even be the mark of another authorial hand.

Attribution of "The Written Record . . ." to Bunting was on the basis of association. It bears no signature, but was discovered with a collection of papers which had belonged to him. The Mountjoy handlist cites the opinion of Peter Quartermain that it was written c.1932-35; Makin, on internal evidence, is inclined to attribute it to "several years before 1930".9 (We have seen that Zukofsky cites it in an essay published in 1931.) But on the basis of these dates two surely quite striking considerations might arise. The first is that, in relation to manuscripts in the collection by Bunting, MS 14 is exceptional because it is early. The second, by the same token, is that it might more plausibly be linked by date and association with the Zukofsky manuscripts. (I have not been able to obtain information about the arrangement of the collection when it was acquired). Indeed, it might be argued that the Mountjoy Collection divides as two categories of material: a carefully retained group of manuscripts with a Zukofsky provenance (I will deal below with the problem of transmission) but not including correspondence; and a miscellaneous accumulation of various later pieces.

Attribution to Bunting has been, I suspect, the expression of a pardonable wish on the part of Bunting scholars. This can be discerned, for example, in Makin's confident attribution based on the survival of the manuscript among Bunting's scant literary remains, but this is surely the confidence of a conviction derived from the pathos of the history he ascribes to the material object itself.

When [Bunting] died, this single typescript was one of the carefully weeded bundle of documents that constituted the entirety of the 'literary papers' in his possession: it had survived, that is, America, Italy, Scotland, Persia, and Italy, and had evaded that voracious engine, Bunting's wastebasket, for more than fifty-five years. I am certain that Bunting would have repudiated any suggestion that it was his philosophical testament, as he repudiated any imputation of systematic thought; yet it was left undestroyed, by a man to whom destroying, not preserving, was natural.10

We may relish, but not too much, the irony of Bunting's repudiation when we take account of what more can be learned of the history of "Paper".

4. FROM AN ATTIC IN BERKELEY

Louis Zukofsky spent the Summer of 1930, en route to the University of Wisconsin, in Berkeley. He announced his impending departure from New York in a letter to Ezra Pound: "Will spend my summer in

9 Ibid, 290 (n.70).
10 Ibid, 290.
Kaigh’s attic and try to do my own work for a change—" The correspondence with Pound continued over the summer, and Zukofsky reported from Berkeley on the progress of his own work, and plans made for it.

Also decided (host and I) on a prospective wish-fulfilment. Should like i.e. publish his essay “Paper” and my Hen Adams, E.P.—His Cantos, Chas. Rez. & Am. Po. 1920-1930 under title Four Essays and Paper. Have already written the foreword:

“The essay Paper by ‘Roger Kaigh’ is presented as the work of an Arunta, a native of central Australia, who used an Anglo-American name for reasons of his own. The author of the other four essays in this volume has, to the best of his knowledge, the only copy available, and it is printed here because it would have been manifestly impossible to take cognizance of its thought consonant with points of aesthetic criticism in the other essays, unless their author divulged the relation.” — You have seen “Paper” and are asked not to divulge its authorship.

The projected book Four Essays and Paper is yet another of those projects of modernism not realised, but notable because Zukofsky’s summary account of its contents both indicates a formal association between his four essays and states a “relation” between his own “aesthetic criticism” and a separately postulated “thought”. The relation is implied not to possess formal status, not to be one of practice to theory, for example; its character requires to be demonstrated by juxtaposition so that the reader of “Paper” might “take cognizance of its thought consonant with” Zukofsky’s criticism: the elliptical syntax limits the relation to consonance and contiguity. Nevertheless, the relation is one which Zukofsky’s readers might well wish had been made more fully open to inspection than has hitherto been the case.

Barry Ahearn, the editor of the Pound/Zukofsky correspondence, notes of “Paper”: “This essay seems not to have survived, nor has the ‘foreword’ Zukofsky mentions.” It has in fact survived, and under not unlikely circumstances. For the rest, forewords and such by Zukofsky are marked by brevity, and I suppose the “already written” foreword to be the paragraph in inverted commas quoted above.

5. THE STATES, A QUARTERLY

At this point it is appropriate to interpolate an account of earlier references to “Paper” retrieved from archival sources. I have not been able to trace the manuscript seen by Pound, or contemporary references to it in Pound’s correspondence. References do, however, occur in Zukofsky’s correspondence with Pound during 1929, and his letters indicate the significance he attached to the essay and also, I suggest, the application he made of its “thought” to his own work.

At the beginning of 1929 Zukofsky was preoccupied with plans for a quarterly, along the lines of Pound’s Exile, to be called The States. A letterhead was printed, with addresses in New York and Philadelphia. Zukofsky was one of four editors, the others being a Philadelphia printer named Kay, who was to produce the magazine, Tibor Serly, and another—unamed—who may possibly have been the author of “Paper”. Zukofsky reported to Pound on the contents intended for the first number: these were to include, as well as poems by William Carlos Williams, Charles Reznikoff, and George Oppen, a “Critical Opus by Roger Kay on the concepts connected with Paper, Aristotelian logic, the relation of ideas to the structure of language, T.S. Eliot (by the way, or in summary), etc.”

Later in the year, after this scheme had fallen through, Zukofsky sent Pound copies of some of the intended contents, including “Paper”. At the same time, he discussed his forthcoming application for a Guggenheim Fellowship. The scheme of work he proposed was to complete “A” and write “a volume of criticism

12 Ibid., 41. (Letter dated 8 September, 1930.)
13 Ibid., 42n.
14 Louis Zukofsky, letters to Ezra Pound, 28 January and 3 March, 1929 (Yale). It will be noted that Kaigh is here spelled Kay. This may be dittography, but may also indicate a family connection with the printer (it is not known what Zukofsky’s connection with him was.) The suspicion that the fourth editor was “Roger Kaigh” is aroused by Zukofsky’s description of him as “a guy who wishes to die in obscurity, tho’ he has sent you material under a pseud, which you replied to with a favorable note.”
15 Furthermore, if Kay was Zukofsky’s familiar name for Kaplan at this time, it may identify Kaplan as the Kay mentioned in “A” - 2, 5, and 6. These references are more extensive in the versions published in An “Objectivist” Anthology (1932), where Kay’s gender is explicitly male, than in “A” - 1-12 (1959) and later editions. (Zukofsky revised these sections of “A” in 1942.)
16 Louis Zukofsky, letter to Ezra Pound, 8 September, 1929 (Yale).
indicating a literary criticism of the vitalization of words, such as ‘A’ might be founded on.” This “literary criticism of the vitalization of words” involved the separate treatment of specific cases (Donne, Henry Adams, LaForgue, Corbière, Rimbaud, Pound) but “A” would also treat some of its “subject matter” as poetry.¹⁶ Zukofsky’s term “vitalization” (which he posited as the outcome of “method”) represents, I suggest, that accomplishment of precise verbal meaning described in the paragraph from “Paper” he quoted in “American Poetry 1920-1930”, an essay which might be read as an account of method.

6. WHO WAS ROGER KAIGH?

Recapitulation may be appropriate at this point in order to hold difficulties in focus. “Paper” by Roger Kaigh has been identified, but the identity of Kaigh remains to be established. However, it is certain that “Roger Kaigh” was not the pseudonym of Basil Bunting, since references to Kaigh and “Paper” occur in Zukofsky’s letters to Pound well before his first meeting with Bunting.

Barry Ahearn identifies “Roger Kaigh”, without explanation, as one Irving Kaplan.¹⁷ Evidence for this identification will be found in Zukofsky’s unpublished correspondence with Pound, and although I regard it as conclusive it is, nevertheless, somewhat peculiar. In a personal communication Ahearn has drawn my attention to a 1931 letter in which Zukofsky advises Pound to write to Kaigh for specific information on the American labour movement, to supplement the bibliography he had already provided, and then gives Irving Kaplan’s name and address. In this letter the names are connected appositively, and identification is based inferentially on the fact that Pound is not told to write care of Kaplan.¹⁸ In addition to this, I draw attention to the earlier letter with which, presumably, Zukofsky enclosed the copy of “Paper” sent to Pound.

If you like “Paper” write the author about it—Mr Irving Kaplan
(sometime Roger Kaigh), 2611 Pacific Avenue, San Francisco,
Cal.¹⁹

Independent confirmation of the identity of Kaigh and Kaplan is provided by Zukofsky’s friend Jerry Reisman, also in a personal communication, although he tells me that he knows nothing about “Paper”.²⁰

The peculiarity of Zukofsky’s references to Kaplan is that both are associated with the wish that Pound write to Kaigh. This is probably no more than a proper compunction not to confuse the Post Office, or embarrass Kaplan, but it is striking nevertheless. Elsewhere in Zukofsky’s letters to Pound the name Kaigh is always used, with and without inverted commas: it serves as both the name of a person and a pseudonym. On the one hand, Kaigh has a local habitation as well as a name, not to mention a wife and an attic. He is the author of an essay which Pound knows in manuscript. But Pound is also made privy to the fiction that “Roger Kaigh” is the pseudonym of an Arunta aboriginal, and is asked not to divulge the author’s identity. Here matters become complicated (more so, indeed, than is yet apparent), for Pound is also being asked not to divulge that “Roger Kaigh” is the person Zukofsky refers to as Kaigh. For Pound, that is to say, the Anglo-American name Roger Kaigh signifies both a person (Zukofsky’s host for the summer and the author of “Paper”) and a device of polemic indirection. At the lower level of complication he is asked to conceal his knowledge that the author of “Paper” is not, as alleged, an Arunta; at the higher level of complication, however, he is being asked to conceal his implied understanding that “Roger Kaigh” is not a pseudonym but the name of a real person. Pound was not actually being misled, for he had previously been told that Kaplan was “sometime Roger Kaigh”, but in the meantime textually Kaplan was again Kaigh. The complication is significant at least to the extent that it is indicative of the degree of equivocation and uncertainty concerning authorship of “Paper” at the time of its circulation (which may not have been wider than Zukofsky, Pound, and Bunting.) The scholars who attributed it to Bunting were, as much as anything, victims of this old confusion.

¹⁶ ibid.
¹⁷ Pound/Zukofsky, 35n.
¹⁸ Barry Ahearn, personal communication, 30 April, 1995. The letter cited is dated 2 March, 1931 (Yale).
¹⁹ Letter of 8 September, 1929, cited above.
At this stage we need to pause. Do we not discern, except when Zukofsky points Pound in Kaplan’s direction, two Roger Kaighs: the Kaigh who is Kaplan, and the “Roger Kaigh” who is the pseudonymous author of “Paper”? This question might be put another way. When Zukofsky refers to his Berkeley friend as Kaigh is he also referring to the author of “Paper”, or is he not, by referring suppositionally to its author as “Kaigh”, disguising its authorship twice over? This will sound complicated, but it has exactly the same degree of complication as the allegation that “Roger Kaigh” is the pseudonym of an Arunta, except that the Arunta is a fiction and Kaplan was not. Nevertheless, if Kaplan was not the author of “Paper”, but its authorship was dissimulated by pseudonymous use of a name associated with him, the fiction of his authorship—as “Kaigh”—would be promulgated. The fiction (however secretly kept) that he was the author of “Paper” would not, however, be the same as the fact that he was not. I hope that this will not be taken for idle ingenuity. Two Kaighs remain logically distinguishable in Zukofsky’s representations to Pound of his friend Kaplan and of “Paper” and its authorship and, although I have no reason to doubt that they were one and the same, were their identity doubted, the implication would be that Zukofsky himself wrote “Paper”, and went to exceptional lengths to disguise the fact. But such doubt would open the way to questioning his presence in San Francisco in 1930 (which his correspondence with Pound would then appear to be at pains to substantiate.) Nevertheless, I have already indicated possible grounds for inferring that Bunting, at least, thought that Zukofsky wrote “Paper”. But on what evidence? There is no reason to suppose that what was not clearly revealed to Pound would have been clearly revealed to Bunting, and whereas it is feasible to suppose that Bunting guessed at a truth behind the fictions surrounding authorship of “Paper”, we cannot assume that he guessed right.

7. WHO WAS IRVING KAPLAN?

To recapitulate yet again, identification of Irving Kaplan as Roger Kaigh does not guarantee that he was the author of “Paper”. It will be helpful, for the time being, to dismiss the name “Roger Kaigh” since it cannot be of further assistance in determining authorship. (It should be recalled, however, that reasons for supposing Zukofsky’s authorship—and there is no direct evidence that this was ever supposed—are a consequence of confusions arising from the use of “Roger Kaigh” as both a personal name and a pseudonym.) But so far Irving Kaplan has been almost more of a cypher than “Roger Kaigh”. What is there to know of him?

Zukofsky’s widow recalled his friendship with Kaplan, which began when both were students at Columbia, in an interview with Carroll F. Terrell. Her evidence casts no direct light on the authorship of “Paper”, but it establishes Kaplan as an historical subject in his own right, and illuminates his relationship with Zukofsky.

Between New York and Washington, as has been seen, Kaplan spent some years in San Francisco. He was there in 1929, and at this time Zukofsky described him to Pound as an expert in corporation taxation. He was still there in 1932, when Zukofsky visited him again, in the company of Jerry Reisman, during the Spring and early Summer. At this time, according to Reisman, Kaplan was employed by the Pacific Gas and Electric Company. Reisman also met Kaplan several times thereafter in New York, at Zukofsky’s apartment, but had no contact with him after the mid-1930s. He describes Zukofsky and Kaplan as engaging in frequent political discussions which developed into intense arguments because Kaplan, unlike Zukofsky, favoured personal activism. Kaplan had “a good sense of humor and enjoyed kidding around. He was friendly, happy and good company.”

At this point, were it not for his habit of finding jobs for old Columbia friends, we might lose sight of Kaplan except for two items, or possibly three, listed in the Library of Congress Catalogue. He was

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The author of two papers, The Research Program of the National Research Project (1937) for the Washington Chapter of the National Statistical Association, and (with David Wintraub) The National Research Project on Reemployment Opportunities and Recent Changes in Industrial Techniques (1938). Perhaps he was also the Irving Kaplan (born 1904, the same year as Zukofsky) listed as co-author, with Charles Jack Lippey, of Professional Cartooning (Newark, 1939).

Kaplan was Associate Director of the National Research Project on Reemployment Opportunities and Recent Changes in Industrial Techniques of the Works Progress Administration, under David Wintraub. In October 1937 he helped Whittaker Chambers, another Columbia friend, get a job with the Project, and in the fullness of time this came to be seen as yet another episode in the systematic Communist infiltration of the Federal government. In the post-war decade Kaplan was a victim of the witch-hunts designed to purge American public life. He was implicated by the testimony of both Elizabeth Bentley ("the blonde spy queen") and Whittaker Chambers. According to Bentley he was a member of two spy rings, through one of which he passed information (he was then employed in the War Production Board), through the other he paid his Party dues. Bentley, who had operated as a courier between Washington and New York, informed to the FBI in August 1945. In the Bureau's report to the White House in November Kaplan was named as one of her contacts. She worked under the direction of the Bureau until 1947, and began to give public testimony before the House Committee on Un-American Activities in 1948. Chambers was then brought into the proceedings, and his testimony also implicated Kaplan. Like most of the others named by Bentley, Kaplan pleaded the Fifth Amendment, but such use of constitutional privilege against self-incrimination was deemed to be a sign of guilt. In the 1950s, when the State Department began to screen American citizens working for the United Nations, those with a history of such pleas were weeded out with the connivance of the Administration in 1953.

This brings us no further forward with the question of the authorship of "Paper", nor does it, I think, cast light on the author's use of a pseudonym, but it extends our understanding of Kaplan as an intellectual of a particular generation and type, and brings him closer to us. David Caute's comment on another dismissed member of the UN's personnel can be adapted to fit his case: his life experience "illuminates the whole radical predicament, not merely [his] fate, but the succession of impulses that led a person of progressive outlook to invest New Deal idealism in the war against Nazi Germany until, encountering and evading the mud barriers of the Cold War, this same idealism flowed outward into new international agencies, where peaceful coexistence and the war against poverty might be fought."23

It would be difficult to extrapolate from the arguments of "Paper"—the insistence, for example, that logic and totemism are both systems for giving reasons—a strong disposition towards the politics with which Kaplan has now been identified, although the attempt might be made. But as a statistician, on the other hand, his


Mention should also be made of James Burnham, The Web of Subversion: Underground Networks in the U.S. Government, The John Day Company; NY 1954, for its account in Chapter 7, "The Reception Hall", of the National Research Project, David Wintraub, and Irving Kaplan. Burnham states that Kaplan was born in Poland in 1900 or 1901, and attended the City College of New York and Fordham Law School as well as Columbia. His book is a popular account of Communist disloyalty, subversion and espionage, one purpose of which was to alert Americans to the continuing internal threat to national security and to the "menace" which threatened to engulf the country. The book is more complex than that, however, for Burnham did not cease to write as a political philosopher, and was clearly not at ease with the figurative language to which he had recourse to narrate the actions of individuals as directed and concerted. "Many of the jobs have all sorts of potentialities for an imagination that might think in terms of "webs", "cells", "networks", "intelligence," and that sort of thing." (Third "Americanist Library" edition, Western Islands: Boston & Los Angeles 1965, 117.) This is telling because these are the terms in which Burnham thinks, of course, not those of a different imagination bent on subverting those jobs to serve its ulterior purposes. Elsewhere Burnham's "web dwellers" are portrayed more as adept boondiggers and log-rollers, careerist networkers on fat salaries, which he specifies with glee. One suspects that this appeal to popular indignation was in part a diversion from the difficulty of moving discursively from the theory of what Communists were for (to serve the interests of a foreign power) to what Communists did (like pleading the Fifth Amendment), since such a task would have required an account of his own intellectual history in relation to the topics of class and revolution. It was precisely such a history, from the early Twenties down to the Fifties, that his subjects had to be denied. Indeed, Burnham came close to arguing that legal provision needed to be made to define who was, and was not, Communist, since Communists could not be relied on to do so. If Kaplan read Burnham's book he might well have reflected, in view of its terminological difficulties and circular logic, that it furnished fresh illustrations for the arguments of "Paper".
intellectual discipline might well be thought to incline him to value particulars and distrust universals, and this is precisely the cast of mind we find throughout “Paper”. And of course, in raising the question of the possibility of Zukofsky’s authorship (there is no reason to enquire any further afield that I can see) I was raising a conceptual phantom. This was necessary since the complex identification of “Kaigh” left a logical cranny into which the possibility of other authorship might creep. But the probability remains that the two Kaighs were one and the same, and that Kaplan wrote “Paper”. What persuades me of this rather more forcefully, however, is a combination of two sorts of reason. The first is that Kaplan is no longer a cypher. Although not much is known about him it is enough to establish his close friendship with Zukofsky through two decades. The second is that there are good reasons not to think that Zukofsky wished to mislead Pound, by forcing “Paper” on his attention while disclaiming authorship. 1.) There is no reason to suppose that Zukofsky wished to mislead Pound, by forcing “Paper” on his attention while disclaiming authorship. 2.) Had Zukofsky, as an “aesthetic critic”, considered that the genre of “Paper” was one with which he should not be associated, the reservation would apply to the essay as a whole. Zukofsky had no need to disown the contribution to the arguments of “American Poetry 1920-1930” made by the propositions contained in the paragraph quoted from “Paper”. On this score probability leads to the conclusion that “Paper” is independent of Zukofsky’s own critical writing, and that there is no reason to doubt the relation subsequently ascribed to them. 3.) Finally, the argument and style of “Paper” do not suggest Zukofsky. It is speculative and assertive rather than categorical and demonstrative; despite what it asserts, moreover, its argument is discursively connected in a way that Zukofsky’s arguments tend not to be. Its sense of humour displays an urbane awareness of paradox; Zukofsky’s humour (not specially noticeable in his criticism) is marked more by a sense of the incongruous. But I need not elaborate my assertion. Hereafter Irving Kaplan will be referred to as the author of “Paper”.

The cancelled matter remaining at the head of the first full leaf of the Durham manuscript is an insufficient basis on which to draw conclusions about motives for the revision of “Paper”. It is easily legible and begins some way into a quotation attributed to a “sage”, whom I have been unable to identify or have identified, and I suppose that if the rest of the cancelled matter could be recovered (i.e. by discovery of an intact manuscript) it might, as well as identifying the sage, cast some light on those motives.24

Pound, unlike Bunting, kept papers, and since Zukofsky sent him a copy of “Paper” it seemed the one most likely, of any other copies, to have survived—unless, indeed, it was the one that passed into Bunting’s hands. Such optimism has proved unfounded insofar as I have been unable to locate a copy of “Paper” in either of the major Pound archives. However, I have located a second manuscript of “Paper” among—a sufficiently obvious place—the Zukofsky papers at the Harry Ransom Humanities Research Center. This is a typewritten manuscript of 28 leaves, and is a fair and perfect copy of the revised text of “Paper” contained in the mutilated Durham manuscript: the text is continuous, and it supplies corrections of the sort Richard Caddel was obliged to make when editing the Durham manuscript. The Texas manuscript will, therefore, have been prepared from another, corrected manuscript of the original version of “Paper”, while the Durham manuscript, in its light, appears to have been a duplicate copy of the original quickly doctored to provide an imperfect copy of the revised version: an economy measure.

Quite what light is thus shed on the Durham manuscript’s transmission to Bunting is unclear. However, the Texas manuscript, in addition to being titled and bearing the pseudonym “Roger Kaigh”, has three other significant features. The text is dated 1922-1923 at its conclusion, where the pseudonym “Roger Kaigh” is repeated. A note

24 The truncated quotation reads as follows. ["..."] ingenious word-twisting of esthetic souls. I am not afraid to say that, at the present day, we do not understand a single line of the Iliad, of the Divine Comedy, in the sense primitively attaching to it. To live is to change, and the posthumous life of our written-down thoughts is not free from the rule: they only continue to exist on condition that they become more and more different from what they were when they issued from our minds. Whatevever in future may be admired in us, will have become altogether alien from us. This is described as stating a bald truth which the paper age dismissed as subjectivism (a concept which belongs to the middle of the 19th Century), but the sage who spoke out against the spirit of the age remains to be identified.
on the title leaf repeats the gist of Zukofsky’s proposed foreword to
*Four Essays and Paper*, namely that the author is an Arunta and that
Zukofsky has the only copy. A final leaf gives an address for “Roger
Kaigh” in the care of Louis Zukofsky at 39-62 65th Street, Woodside,
Long Island. This dates the manuscript to the Summer of 1937 when
Zukofsky had “Paper” retyped following Pound’s suggestion that if it
had still not been printed it might be submitted to *Globe*. Pound was
recommending *Globe* as a source of income, and this may imply that
he thought that “Paper” was Zukofsky’s, but Zukofsky’s reply refers to
it as Kaigh’s.25 Nothing came of this, but it is striking that
Zukofsky was sufficiently interested in Pound’s suggestion to have
“Paper” retyped; he also proposed to send *Globe* his 1936 essay
“Modern Times”, a manuscript copy of which is also in the Mountjoy
Collection.

Except on this occasion all references to “Paper” are
Zukofsky’s, and all occur during 1929 and 1930; in the earliest of
these its author is already identified by a pseudonym, but the fiction of
Arunta authorship appears later. It arises (as will be seen below) from
the ethnological background to the arguments of “Paper”, but has no
ostensible purpose (except as a gag) except in relation to its
connection with Zukofsky’s four essays (mostly written in late 1929
and early 1930), which was both actual and intended to be explicit.
Just what this purpose was may be guessed, but I incline to suppose
that it was discovered during Zukofsky’s 1930 visit to Kaplan, and
that revision of “Paper” was undertaken then with a view to
sustaining this exotic new cultural identity for its author. Such
supposition is self-consistent and not inconsistent with any evidence,
but is not independently corroborated.

9. “PAPER” AND BUNTING

“Paper” was part of the intellectual currency of Zukofsky and Pound
in 1929 and 1930, although we don’t know what value Pound

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25 Ina Nadel informs me that Zukofsky lived at the Woodside address from July to September
1937. This is confirmed by unpublished correspondence in the Pound papers at Yale, which Barry
Ahern has drawn to my attention: Pound wrote to Zukofsky about *Globe* on 24 July, 1937;
Zukofsky’s reply is dated 7 August. *Globe* was a travel magazine published in St. Paul,
Minnesota, for which Pound may have supposed that an essay mentioning aborigines’ ideas about
spirit- causation provided suitable copy.

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ascribed to it. During this period Bunting was close to Pound at
Rapallo, and met Zukofsky for the first time, in New York. We might
assume the existence of no more than three manuscript copies of the
original “Paper”: how, and under what auspices, did one come into
Bunting’s possession, and how had it acquired the modifications
which bring it substantively in line with the revised version? It is
unlikely that he obtained it from Pound, for in letters to him referring
to “Some Limitations of English” he makes no reference to “Paper”,
and I infer that he was unaware that Pound had seen it. There is no
evidence that I am aware of that contact occurred between Bunting
and Kaplan. On balance I incline to the view that Bunting received the
manuscript from Zukofsky. It is not clear when this would have
occurred, and Bunting’s surviving letters to Zukofsky are silent on
this point. Zukofsky met Bunting between 11 and 19 July, 1930,
before his trip to Berkeley, and they remained in contact during the
rest of Bunting’s American visit (he was back in Rapallo in March
1931), including a meeting in Wisconsin when Bunting was visiting
his parents-in-law at Eau Claire.26 It seems unlikely that Zukofsky
would have thrust “Paper” on Bunting at a first meeting and, in any
case, if “Paper” was revised thereafter, when Zukofsky was in
Berkeley, the manuscript in Bunting’s possession would preclude that
possibility. As regards Zukofsky’s motive for giving a copy of
“Paper” to Bunting, its relation to his own work has been noted, and
he would have been aware that Bunting shared some of its points of
reference. It is noteworthy that the manuscript in Bunting’s possession
is devoid of indications of authorship, including the Arunta fiction. (I
forebear to speculate how the silence of textual anonymity might have
been breached when the manuscript was put in Bunting’s hands.)

These considerations are significant if Bunting wrote “Some
Limitations of English” with “Paper” in mind. Before 21 November,
1930, he had sent the essay to *Hound and Horn* and *The Criterion*,
and there was opportunity for him to have obtained “Paper” before

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26 Bunting left Zukofsky a note on 11 July (information from Peter Quartermain); on 19 July
Zukofsky informed Pound that they had met (information from Barry Ahern); Bunting mentioned
his visit to Wisconsin in a letter to Pound dated 27 October (Yale); Victoria Forde (*The Poetry of
Basil Bunting*, Bloodaxe Books: Newcastle upon Tyne 1991, 28) mentions that Bunting saw
Zukofsky while on a visit to his parents-in-law, and I suppose this to be the occasion she refers to.
Bunting’s letter to Pound of 21 November, cited above, mentions that he has been in
 correspondence with Zukofsky, but letters from this period have not survived with his others to
Zukofsky at the Harry Ransom Humanities Research Center.
that.\footnote{27} He had met Zukofsky again in Wisconsin, and corresponded with him. Opportunity on its own is not enough to constitute proof, however, and there would have been equal if not greater opportunity for Zukofsky to show Bunting “Paper” after “Some Limitations of English” was written. (It is possible, indeed, that Bunting acquired his copy later, following the Globe episode, on his second visit to America in 1938.) Makin suggests that “The Written Record...” (i.e. “Paper”) “leads to the more sophisticated thought of... ‘Some Limitations of English’”, but such a notion is inapplicable if they are by different hands.\footnote{28} Nor are they, indeed, to be differentiated in terms of degrees of sophistication, since they are written from different points of view and address different issues. Nevertheless the case may be advanced hypothetically that “Some Limitations of English” was written with “Paper” in mind, and this can best be done by considering how the essays differ in their treatment of the same idea: the relation of language to thought.

“Paper” is centrally concerned with the illusions of permanence and authority induced by a written or “paper” culture, in which words become terms susceptible to final definition, and abstractions acquire the status of universals. Aristotle, who “decided that the search for these phantoms [i.e. universals] was the most glorious thing in a moral life”, formalised the system of logic whereby propositions about the universe might be regulated.\footnote{29} In Section IV of the essay it is argued that formal logic is presumptive and circular; its extension as a critique of western intellectual and institutional culture (a critique, as it were, from within: “the revolt of paper against itself”) is not noted, nor was this Bunting’s concern. (Elsewhere they both, of course, indicate other grounds for a more extensive social critique.) Zukofsky uses “Paper” to suggest how writing may obtain for itself some of the virtues of speech. Bunting, in his essay, is concerned with the limitations of language in general and, as his title indicates, of English in particular, and regards these limitations as both cognitive and expressive. He thus admits to his essay many of the topics dealt with in “Paper”, but deals with them cursorily in the first of its two sections, under the heading “These Platitudes”. If he had read “Paper” he refused to let its excited insistence affect his sang-froid.

“Some Limitations of English”, when read against “Paper”, reveals difference of emphasis. In preliminary remarks about style, contradicting Buffon, Bunting detaches style from the man and attaches it to thought: it is “skill in the use of language to convey thought”, and later he appeals to Wittgenstein to indicate “the limits of language in general as a medium of thought”. This bracketing of writing between thought and language situates additional preliminary remarks on the limitations of language: unlike mathematics it affords neither precision nor accuracy. These are not the same as either definition or meaning in “Paper”: for Bunting the poet’s empirical

\footnote{27} See note 7, above.
\footnote{28} Bunting: The Shaping of his Verse, 290-91.
\footnote{29} Here, and throughout the ensuing discussion of “Paper” and “Some Limitations of English”, I quote from Three Essays (where, of course, “Paper” appears as “The Written Record...”). Since both essays are short and quoted material is easy to locate no page references will be given.

\footnote{30} Kaplan here refers, I think, to speakers of the Klamath language (see note 34, below.)
judgements are approximate and, like the farmer's, based on direct experience and precedent.

For Bunting, therefore, there is no necessary opposition between speech and writing (and its superstructure of cultural practices), and something rather more like resistance between language and thought. Thus he approaches the determination of thought by language in his own way. While he observes that "we owe most of our industrial machinery . . . to the tongue we speak, as well as the whole system of chemistry which enables us to invent and manufacture high explosives with which to persuade speakers of less analytical languages to acquiesce in our notions", this barbed irony is parenthetical, as is the suggestion that "some savage languages are more in harmony [with] the recent developments of physical philosophy", so that "speakers of such a language [may] be the leaders of thought in an age in which synthesis rather than analysis is the prime process of thought". But Bunting is neither triumphant nor dismayed to discover that the languages of different cultures may imply different metaphysics and cosmographies, since "one realises that the corner of the known universe expressible in any language is small". He is rather more struck by the fact that "John lives in a world which here and there coincides with l’univers de Jean", and that it is "possible to perceive facts and relations in French which do not exist in English, and vice versa".

Hence for Bunting it is axiomatic that languages condition thought differently, including the perception of facts and relations, and that for the writer this occurs on a more intimate scale than is implied in "Paper" by the grand contrast of world views and cultures, in which Kaplan follows Lévy-Bruhl. The second section of Bunting's essay, headed "Ergo", is then specifically addressed to how the English writer may "understand the limitations of the language" and "overcome them". This is not the occasion to dwell on the localism already implicit in Bunting's view of the writer's relation to language, or his practical suggestions (which might be constructively compared with Zukofsky's.) But it needs to be noted that his suggestions are intended to overcome limitations discovered in the analytical tendency of English: writers should "try to bring a more synthetic element into it." Under the heading "These Platitudes" he had indicated that the analytical bent of modern European languages "falsifies reality and causes us to live in a world of self-constructed fantoms", and here his views, and choice of word, are remarkably close to "Paper". But he does not endorse the view that meaning is most fully realised and vivid in speech. Proximity and difference of views can perhaps best be illustrated by quotation of two extended passages from Bunting.

Our accident is almost wholly resolved into autonomous abstract notions. We retain a genitive which, however, tends towards the condition of an adjective, and a few tense modifications of the verb. The rest of the modifications of meaning in a set of related ideas are now expressed by pronouns auxiliaries and prepositions utterly abstract words which standing by themselves have a meaning only for the most inveterate logician and yet which refuse to coalesce with their principals to make a more concrete word which would be valid to people less given to splitting ideas, chopping off / from am, etc.

Bunting here is hankering after the integrity of the Latin verb, and he has things to say about the advantages an inflected language has for the arrangement of words. In "Paper" the verb "to be" is duplicitous because of its use both as a copulative and to mean "to exist"; Bunting prefers the inflected forms of the verb of a dead language only available in writing. If Bunting knew "Paper" this is surely shrewdly oblique, but still more so, perhaps, is the second of these passages.

Impersonal utterance is increasingly difficult. Demonstratives imply the existence of a localized speaker and if they are used at all freely the poet is apt to find that what he designed for a universal has become a particular, what was to apply to the world at large or men in general has become attached to his own personal self and in so doing has lost indeed not a larger validity but the appearance of it. What was to have come home forcefully to all readers has turned into gossip.

But if this is applied to "Paper" it will be seen, the approved "universal" notwithstanding, that this is not contradiction but modification. "Paper" has nothing to say about the person or personal meaning: its concept of speech refers not to an action but to a transaction. From his different direction, Bunting's "designed universal" remains purposive. Bunting appears to share with "Paper" the understanding that it is the quality of utterance rather than logical proof that carries conviction. For, as "Paper" has it, in another appeal
to the performative character of spoken language, “arguments are
decided ‘ad hominem’. They are settled by their length and loudness;
by a wry face, a laugh or a shrug of the shoulders”. This is meaning
performed as dialogue. But Bunting’s sense of localised discourse
(any language dealing only with its own “corner of the known
universe”) also surely implies a notion of linguistic community as
inherently dialogic. It is possible to conclude on the distinction that
whereas in “Paper” the universal is understood to derive from
abstraction for Bunting it is a projection of the concrete.

This is a considerable distinction, needless to say, but whether
or not Bunting saw “Paper” before he wrote “Some Limitations of
English”, or set out silently to moderate what he may have regarded as
over-emphatic, comparison reveals that both essays cover similar
ground and share similar views. Both, for example, regard thought as
relative to language, and consider that the language in which they are
written has an inbuilt tendency to deplete experience, to make the
lived world a phantom. But they do not have a common purpose, and
whereas in “Paper” the writer’s position is that of an intellectual,
critical of his own class, Bunting’s contemplation of the future, for
writing at least, is tempered by a vision of the past. Just as our
language has “lost the benefit of a whole view, a unified conception,
concentration, intensity”, so this is “comparable to the breakup of
craftsmanship with its complex of deft motions”.

It is worth emphasizing that similarities as well as differences
between the essays arise from the writers’ independent thought and
argument, and do not simply reflect a common point of reference, but
it will probably be helpful, in order to establish such a distinction,
to indicate what that point of reference was, and to suggest why Bunting
was dismissive of what was, for Kaplan, immensely exciting. Bunting
was an attentive reader of The Criterion, and there, even if from
nowhere else, would have acquired a knowledge of contemporary
anthropology and its cultural readings of the “primitive”.

Indeed it was precisely the “primitive” or archaic aspect of W. H. Auden’s
Paid on Both Sides: A Charade that seems to have drawn his
attention. It can be supposed, therefore, that he recognised the
intellectual background of “Paper” at once, and found it
commonplace—which, indeed, by 1930 it arguably was. Literary
appropriations of such material, moreover, were becoming two a
penny. But Kaplan was writing in the early 1920s, when this
anthropological work was more novel, and although his contemporary
sources appear completely assimilated their outcome in his essay is so
much his own work that it is misleading to regard them even as
background. He worked back, unless I am mistaken, to their primary
sources.

Kaplan’s immediate source for information about both
African aborigines and North-West Coast native Americans would
be Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, Les fonctions mentales dans les sociétés
inférieures (1910), which he must have read in French. Here, as
well as the ethnographic data Lévy-Bruhl compiled from fieldwork
reports, he would have come across two important arguments. The
first is embedded in a critique of the English school of anthropology,
which by its theoretical dependence on the concept of animism
implicitly subscribed, Lévy-Bruhl argued, to a universal theory of
mind. The second, which underpins his book as a whole, was that the
concept of collective representation allowed a common and
comprehensive, but pre-logical system of mental representation to be
identified among “primitive” peoples. In “Paper”, of course, Kaplan
stands Lévy-Bruhl’s relation of the pre-logical and the logical on its
head. Moreover, he was not content to rely on Lévy-Bruhl’s
ethnography: there are details in his account of Australian aborigines’
ceremonies, and the grammatical structure of a native American
language, which he would not have found there. Kaplan, that is to say,
consulted Lévy-Bruhl’s sources for additional data. Is it fanciful to

31 The first of Lévy-Bruhl’s books to be published in English was La mentalité primitive (1922),
translated as Primitive Mentality, George Allen & Unwin: London 1923. Les fonctions mentales
dans les sociétés inférieures appeared later, translated as How Natives Think, George Allen &
Unwin: London 1926.

32 For example, Kaplan would have found the reason given in explanation for failure of the
Arunta rain ceremony in Baldwin Spencer and F.J.Gillen, The Native Tribes of Central Australia,
Macmillan: London 1899. “In the case of many of the totems it is just when there is promise of the
approach of a good season that it is customary to hold the ceremony. While this is so, it sometimes
happens that the members of a totem, such as, for example, the rain or water totem, will hold their
Intichiuma when there has been a long drought and water is badly wanted; if rain follows within a
reasonable time, then of course it is due to the influence of the Intichiuma; if it does not, then the
non-success is at once attributed to the evil and counter influence of some, usually distant, group
of men.” op.cit. 170. Lévy-Bruhl draws extensively on the work of Spencer and Gillen, but
because the Intichiuma ceremonies interest him for what they reveal about “primitive” mentality

33 See Robert Crawford, The Savage and the City in the Work of T.S. Eliot, Clarendon Press:
Oxford 1987, 177-78 and 191-92, for an account of the attention given to anthropology by T. S.
Eliot as editor of The Criterion.

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claim that the suggestion that “Roger Kaigh” was the pseudonym of an Arunta originates in Kaplan’s reading of Spencer’s and Gillen’s account of their fieldwork with the Arunta tribe.55 In “Some Limitations of English” Bunting refers parenthetically to Lévy-Bruhl on the subject of “savage languages”. For him these were no more than a starting point, as his account to Pound of his essay indicates.

as a system of collective representation he is not interested in the efficiency of the ceremonies in achieving a specific outcome (indeed, the question could not arise), nor is he interested in the psychology of individuals or groups engaged in a particular performance of a ceremony. Hence he ignores data which for Kaplan was important.

I suppose that Kaplan also read Émile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, George Allen & Unwin: London 1915. Durkheim’s book, first published in French in 1912, is based almost exclusively on Australian data. In its account of the Arunta form of the Intichiuma ceremony Kaplan would have come across, on facing pages, his references to ceremonies at Lake Eyre (332) and explanations of ritual failure (333). But Durkheim’s account is interpretive and syncretic, and he is not greatly interested in the purposes of the ceremonies he aggregates or their particular detail, and, in fact, the Lake Eyre ceremony he refers to was to ensure the reproduction of the carpet snake. Durkheim is concerned to make the point that “it never enters [the native’s] mind that a favourable result could be obtained by any other means”: for him the results intended are exotic and, in any case, as natural events they are understood as the outcome of the operations of scientific law, as a sociologist who in his present situation and, without Durkheim’s (or Lévy-Bruhl’s) evolutionist and positivist prejudices, he finds the Aruntas’ capacity to rationalise significant of more than their ignorance of natural causation. Thus if Kaplan checked the source, quoted above, for Durkheim’s remarks about the explanation of unfavourable results he would have found an account of the matter specifically with reference to rain-making, the example of aboriginal expertise instanced in “Paper”.

My point is not so much that Kaplan used Lévy-Bruhl’s and Durkheim’s material critically as that he consulted their sources. Explanation, rain-making, and Lake Eyre could not, I think, have been brought together as they are in “Paper” if he had not done so. Similarly, Kaplan’s comments on the structure of his North-West Coast native American language go into more detail (for example, concerning indistinction of nominal and verbal forms, and the verbal form of negation) than he would have found in Lévy-Bruhl. I suspect that he referred to A. S. Gatschet, The Klamath Indians of southwestern Oregon, Government Printing Office: Washington 1890 (cited by Lévy-Bruhl) and as well, perhaps, his “Real”, “true”, and “genuine” in Indian languages”, American Anthropologist (n.s.) 1 (Jan. 1899). I have not been able to consult either of these.

The work of Spencer and Gillen was extensively illustrated with photographs, and has great immediacy; this was not lost on T. S. Eliot, who thought that it was “not necessary, perhaps not even desirable . . . to purge all the works of Miss Harrison, Cooke, Rendel Harris, Lévy-Bruhl or Durkheim. But one ought, surely, to have read at least one book such as those of Spencer and Gillen on the Australians . . . ” (“War-paint and Feathers” [1919], cited in Crawford, The Savage and the City, 98.) Baldwin Spencer revised some of his work with F. J. Gillen as The Arunta, A Study of a Stone Age People, 2 vols., Macmillan and Co.: London 1927, and this may have revived Kaplan’s interest, or reminded Zukofsky of it, and suggested identification of the author of “Paper” as an Arunta. It would not have been a sufficient source, however, for references in “Paper” to aborigines, and does not suggest that the date given in the Texas manuscript might be misleading.

It implies that Kaffir has advantages English hasn’t as a medium for precise thought. It traces idealism to our syntax. It states that there can be no radical improvement in human affairs without first an overhauling of the language—carried out of course by poets in poetry.36

In summary this is perhaps closer to “Paper” than to the essay Bunting wrote, although its emphases are in place. But it is possible to feel that Kaplan was able to find rather more in Lévy-Bruhl than Bunting. For surely, in this final quotation—from Lévy-Bruhl—is the seed of that part of his argument which Zukofsky was so taken by.

The Coroados of Brazil complete and perfect the meaning of their sentences by their accent, the speed or slowness of the pronunciation, and certain signs made with hand or mouth, or other gestures.37

For Kaplan, of course, these performative aspects of meaning are not exclusively “savage”.

If a dialogue can be established between these two essays then it is not necessarily important to establish that Bunting wrote in response; yet if he did not he must have read “Paper”, when it came into his possession, as an essay addressing his own topics. Circumstantial reasons for supposing that he thought it to be Zukofsky’s have been indicated above, and it remains to mention a public riposte by Bunting to Zukofsky. That is the “Open Letter to Louis Zukofsky” of 1932, in which he takes issue with Zukofsky’s Preface to An “Objectivists” Anthology. Here he argues with Zukofsky out of respect, and challenges him where he deviates from the excellence of his normal practice. This critical attitude might be motive and method for “Some Limitations of English”, as well as suggestive of its occasion. For the poet who wrote “Criticism, especially my own, is painful to me” it is difficult to suppose an occasion more compelling than “Paper”.38

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36 How Natives Think, 164.
NOTE

I wish to acknowledge scholarship’s debt to the dog as aid and model: it was my wife’s whippet bitch Amy whose nocturnal insistence on being let out brought on the insomniac episode employed to check the Zukofsky “Paper” paragraph against “The Written Record . . .”, and whose persistence on the scent later afforded the leisure in which doubts about Bunting’s authorship were formed. Richard Caddel, Peter Makin, and Peter Quartermain were quick and generous to accept my identification and attribution of “Paper”, and have helped with advice and information. I am grateful to Barry Ahearn, Ira Nadel and Jerry Reisman for information as well, and to Eric Homberger for pointing out Irving Kaplan’s position in the post-war discourse of anti-communism. Cathy Henderson (Harry Ransom Humanities Research Center, University of Texas at Austin), Saundra Taylor (The Lilly Library, Indiana University), and Patricia Willis (The Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Collection, Yale University) were, as ever, patient and thorough in dealing with enquiries, and I am glad to have another opportunity to express my gratitude to each of them. For permission to quote unpublished material by Basil Bunting and Louis Zukofsky in the Yale Collection of American Literature, Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Yale University, I am grateful to John Halliday (for the estate of Basil Bunting), Paul Zukofsky (for the estate of Louis Zukofsky), and Yale University Library.